Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintenance in Florida by Fink, Richard Krieger
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
6-1-1951
Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintenance in Florida
Richard Krieger Fink
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Krieger Fink, Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintenance in Florida, 5 U. Miami L. Rev. 553 (1951)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol5/iss4/4
FAIR TRADE AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
IN FLORIDA
RICHARD KRIEGER FINK*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 5th, 1949, the Florida Supreme Court, in a six to one decision,
held the Florida fair trade law' invalid inder the Florida and United States
Constitutions in Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.2 Less
than two months later, the Florida State Legislature amended the act in an
attempt to make it meet the approval of the court and still not be shorn of
its desired effect. Before examining the Liquor Stores case 3 and the new
act in detail to weigh the possibilities of the act's survival, perhaps a short
summary of the history of fair trade laws in Florida, with a special emphasis
on the problem of resale price maintenance, would be appropriate.4
A. In General
Resale price maintenance is "that systeum of distributing trade-marked
articles by which the trade-mark owner fixes the price at which his trade-
marked goods are to be sold by wholesalers and retailers irrespective of their
individual contractual relations with the trade-mark owner."'  However,
resale price maintenance is not necessarily limited to articles with trade-
marks, and has, for example, been tried on copyrighted material. The fair
trade laws are limited to branded goods, but there have been attempts to
expand the device.
Resale price maintenance has been favored generally by two economic
classes. The producers or trade-mark owners support it to the extent that
they feel that price cutting would detract from the good will of their product.
It is easy to see how the confidence of the public would be undermined in,
for example, a wrist watch selling for a dollar" when retailers start advertising
it for less. The consumer would then refuse to pay more than the adver-
tised price; and, thus, other distributors, unable to cut their price lower
because of higher fixed overhead costs, would no longer be able to handle
the producer's watch. The other group which has supported resale price
maintenance has been the retailers, generally represented by their organized
associations, who have seen the general harm caused by price wars and have
favored price fixing to deter their price cutting competitors.7 However,
*Member of Florida Bar. LLB, Harvard.
1. Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19201.
2. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
3. Ibid.
4. For detailed discussions of the fair trade act, sce REPORT OF TnE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (United States Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D. C. 1945); E. T. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE
LECISLATION (Oxford University Press, N. Y. 1939).
5. CALLMAN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs 358 (1945).
6. See Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 89 N.J. Eq. 332, 108 Ati. 128 (1918).
7. See notes 36 and 37 infra.
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these supporters of price maintenance include less desirable bedfellows, such
as those who wish to rig prices higher so as to increase their profits and the
inefficient wholesaler and retailer who is carried along by artificially high
prices, but could not last in a purely competitive market.
On the other side, there are groups opposing resale price maintenance.
These include the consumers who benefit by lower prices, especially when
based on lower costs, and the efficient distributor who by cutting distri-
bution costs can attract customers by lower prices. These groups are sup-
ported, however, by two less commendable groups, the monopolists who try
to ruin competition, and sharks who lure the buyers into their stores by loss
leaders and then overcharge them on other items.
Price fixing statutes in general, and resale price maintenance, in par-
ticular, have had very rough sailing in Floridian judicial waters in recent
years. These statutes seemed to fall into three separate categories: (I)
those on price fixing by a board (2) statutes on price agreements for a par-
ticular business (3) fair trade acts as commonly understood, applying to all
branded goods.
As an example of the first type, a 1935 statute empowering a board of
barber examiners to fix minimum prices to be charged by barbers in Florida
was held unconstitutional in 1936 in the case of Fulton v. Ives'0 as a denial
of equal protection and due process of law and improper restraint upon the
freedom to contract. This statute was amended by the Florida Legislature
in 1941'' and held not unconstitutional, a year later, on the ground that the
legislature had found that the services of barbers are "affected with a public
interest.'' 2 However, this act, too, was declared unconstitutional in 1943,1:1
on the grounds that there was not sufficient notice given to the public of
the price fixing hearings held by the Barbers' Sanitary Commission, and that
there was unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Commission. In
the same year that the Fulton case' 4 had declared the barber statute invalid,
a so-called "emergency" statute' under which a Milk Control Board was
authorized to forbid sale of milk at a price less than that fixed by the
Board, or on different ternis, was upheld as not a denial of due process or
equal protection.' This case seemed to indicate that regulation and price
fixing by the legislature would be permitted if the subject were affected by
a public interest. The cleaning, dyeing, pressing, and laundry industries
were considered affected by a public interest, in Bon Ton Cleaners and Dyers
8. A discussion of the relationship between resale price maintenance and price
fixing follows on pages 559-561.
9. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 16799.
10. 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936).
11. Fla. Laws 1941, e. 20425.
12. McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 114, 9 So.2d 284, 287 (1942).
13. Robbins v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 153 Fla. 822, 16 So.2d 121 (1943).
14. Supra note 10.
15. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17103.
16. Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Board, 124 Fla. 797, 169
So. 541 (1936).
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v. Cleaning, Dyeing & Pressing Board,"1 and Miami Laundry v. Florida Dry
Cleaning 6 Laundry Board,"8 which cases involved statutes creating boards
for the regulation of these industries. The court was also influenced by the
fact that this was an emergency measure.
The subject of liquor, apparently, was not sufficiently in the public
interest to be regulated, since a statute,' 9 an example of the second type,
providing for fair trade contracts and minimum resale prices for intoxicating
liquors was held unconstitutional in 1942.20 This statute had some of the
elements of the first type since the fair trade contracts were to be tinder
the supervision of the State Beverage Department. Therefore, this law
seemed to remove liquor from the general fair trade law of 1939, which is
discussed following. The main objection of the court seemed to be the lack
of a legislative finding of necessity and that the statute was for public
health, safety, morals or welfare.
Let us now shift from the boards and the limited type of statute on
price agreements to the broad type to which this paper is mainly devoted.
The first Florida fair trade law embracing resale price maintenance agree-
ments for all trade-marked goods was enacted in 1937;2' however, this was
held invalid in 1939.22 The ground for its invalidity was that although the
statute, by its title,2 3 purported to protect the trade-mark owner and others
dealing with the products by use of voluntary contracts with retailers to
establish minimum resale prices, there was a "no-signors clause," a provision
against violation of such contracts whether the violator "is or is not a party
to such contract."24 This was the only ground for invalidation, and the
court did not discuss any other objedtions to the statute. The title was
subsequently amended to remove this objection.25 It would seem strange,
17. 128 Fla. 533, 176 So. 55 (1937), which did not pass on the constitutionality
of a price fixing statute for cleaning and dyeing (Fla. Laws 1935, c. 16979), but admitted
that it was departing from the Fulton case.
18. 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938), and Robinson v. Florida Dry Cleaning &
Laundry Board, 141 FHa. 899, 194 So. 269 (1940), which upheld the constitutionality of
Fla. Laws 1937, c. 17894.
19. Fla. Laws 1941, c. 21001.
20. Scarborough v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So2d 913 (1942).
21. Fla. Laws 1937, c. 18395.
22. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co. 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91
(1939).
23. An Act to Protect Trade-Mark Owners, Producers, Distributors and the General
Public Against Injurious and Uneconomic Practices in the Distribution of Competitive
Commodities Bearing a Distinguishing Trade-Mark, Brand or Name, Through the Use
of Voluntary Contracts Establishing Minimum Resale Prices and Providing for Refusal
to Sell Unless Such Minimum Resale Prices are Observed.
24. See la. Laws 1949, c. 25204, § 8.
25. Supra note 1.
An Act to Protect Good Will Represented by Trade-Marks, Names or Brands,
Against Injury by Authorizing Contracts Establishing Resale Prices on Commodities
Bearing Them and Defining as Unfair Competition and Making Actionable Knowingly
and Wilfully to Advertise and Sell Such Commodities at Less than the Prices Established
in the Contracts Authorized by This Act, Whether the Person So Advertising and Selling
is or is not a Party to Such Contract.
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especially in the light of the intervening cases of McRae v. Robbins, supra,
and Scarborough v. Vebb, supra, both in 1942, that this act was not chal-
lenged in ten years. However, there is no report of any litigation by the
Florida Supreme Court on this law until this statute was declared unconsti-
tutional in the Liquor Stores case,""* in 1949. '[his seems especially strange
for this broad law to last until 1949, sinicc a limited price agreement law
was upset in 1942 due to lack of public interest. The distinction might have
been the existence of a board to fix prices in the laws upset earlier, instead
of voluntary price maintenance b agreement. However, validity of this
distinction can be disputed. It would seem that an unbiased government
board composed of men with no axe to grind could more fairly set prices
in a given industry than the members of the industry who are bound to be
motivated by self-interest.
II. THE LIQUOR STORES CASE
Let us now consider the Liquor Stores case 21 in some detail. The plain-
tiff, Continental Distilling Corporation, a foreign corporation manufactur-
ing liquor, sold certain trade-marked whiskies to two Florida retail whiskey
dealers who are not parties to this suit, under contracts28 pursuant to the
Florida fair trade law,2 9 whereby the retailers would not resell the liquors
below a price fixed by the plaintiff. The defendant, Liquor Stores, Inc., a
retailer, purchased some of plaintiff's trade-marked liquors with notice of
the contract; however, the defendant had not signed the contract. '[he
plaintiff brought suit under the Florida fair trade lawan0 to enjoin defendants
from advertising and selling the whiskies with the plaintiff's trade-mark
("Philadelphia Blended Whiskey") below the price set by the plaintiff.
A motion to dismiss the bill was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Florida held the act an invalid exercise of legislative police power in that
it violated due process and equal protection of law 3 and was an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority32 under the Florida and United States
Constitutions.
When Continental Distilling Corporation brought action against Liquor
Stores, Inc., the old nemesis of Florida fair trade in three previous cases
(Robbins v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 153 Fla. 822, 16 So. 2d 121 [1943];
Scarborough v. Webb's Ctt-Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So. 2d 913
[1942]; Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188
So. 91 [1939] ), the price cutting drug firm of "Webb's Cut-Ratc Drug
Company," or, more recently, "Webb's City," intervened as party defendant.
A word should be said about the canny price-cutter, "Doc" Webb, and
26. Supra note 2.
27. Supra note 2.
28. Supra note 2, at 376-377.
29. Supra note 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Fi. CONST., Declaration of Rights, §§ 1, 12.
32 FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
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his colorful retailing tactics in his fabulous "Webb's City", a combined
drug-clothing-grocery-hardware-jewelry store, barber shop, etc. In price
wars, he has sold 79c butter for 19c, $17 tires for $9.95, $4.50 paint
with free paint brushes for $1.79, $2 shirts at 68c, shampoo and finger wave
for 49c and large-size breakfasts, in pre-war days, for 3c. He has taken losses
on these "come-on" attractions, the most famous of which was to sell 4,500
one-dollar bills at 89c and offer to buy them back at $1.35, in order to attract
customers into his store to buy other profit-making articles, such as an odd
lot of hard-to-move stock which he bought from a grateful wholesaler at a
few cents per item and sold at more than ten times cost and still below list
price. Thus, it is understandable why Vebb's City's president would be a
tireless enemy of Florida fair trade laws, and spend thousands of dollars in
court actions and newspaper advertising attacking them.
A. Invalid Exercise of Police Power and Violation of Due Process.
The court said that this was a price fixing statute which eliminated
free competition, interfered with freedom to contract and to deal with one's
property, and could not be sustained under the police power unless economic
conditions clearly necessitated such a measure in the public interest. Under
the present economic conditions of relative prosperity, the court continued,
there could be no basis on which the legislature could infringe upon consti-
tutional liberties.
The dissent assumed throughout its opinion that the questioned legis-
lation is reasonable and is in the interest of public safety, morals, health,
welfare, etc., something which the majority refused to do. In this respect,
the dissent was bolstered by the United States Supreme Court, which passed
on the validity of the Illinois fair trade law,33 a statute very similar to the
Florida statute, and said that the act was not "so arbitrary, unfair, or wanting
in reason as to result in a denial of due process." 3'
It would appear that a particularly homogeneous federal system would
not be the result when the same type of statute is declared to be valid as not
a violation of "due process" (or, for that matter, a violation of "equal pro-
tection" or a delegation of legislative powers) under the Federal Consti-
tution, and still be declared to violate the state constitution's "due process",
(or equal protection or delegation). The Maryland Court in Goldsmith v.
Mead Johnson 6 Co.,35 upheld the Maryland fair trade act and based its
decision on the ground that the law of the land, as used in the Declaration
of Rights in the Maryland Constitution, has the same significance as "due
process of law" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the Fair Trade Act does not violate the due process of law clause of
the Federal Constitution. 0
33. SMIlsn-HuRD REv. STAT. 1935, c. 121 /; Ill. State Bar Stat. 1935, c. 140.
34. Old Dearborn v. Seagram, 299 U.S. 183, 194 (1936).
35. 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939).
36. Supra note 34.
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It could reasonably be argued that it is desirous for the general welfare
for the small businessman, "who has clung to the traditional American
principles that he had a right to engage in business on his own account, if
he desired to do so," 7 to remain in business; that it is not healthy, economic-
ally and morally, for him to be forced out by the price cutting of larger
competitors; that we prefer many individual entrepreneurs to a few large
monopolies with everyone working for them as clerks; and, if we assume
that the only means to protect these small businessmen is by resale price
maintenance which would prevent price cutting, then this law seems to be
an acceptable constitutional means of exercising the police power to protect
public safety, health, welfare, morals, etc. However, we cannot assume that
the only means, or, even, the most effective means, to protect small business-
men is by maintaining prices; and, therefore, it could be well argued on the
other side that small businessmen, not protected by resale price maintenance,
could survive by keeping on their toes and running economical and enterpris-
ing businesses, and, thus, the consumer, too, would benefit by not having to
pay prices artificially rigged higher than necessary.
B. Equal Protection.
It appears that the majority's objection to this statute within the frame-
work of equal protection follows two lines of approach. First, it believed that
the trade-mark owner is receiving preference over the producer of non-mark-
ed goods. Second is that it feared that in the case where the producer is
pressured into fixing his prices by the retailer, the producer and the con-
sumer are not given equal protection vis a vis the retailer.
As to the first approach, the classification between the trade-mark own-
er and persons who do not own trade-marks seems to be reasonable. The
trade-mark is the means by which the consumer identifies the product, and
without it the producer has no good will to be protected. 38 There is little
reason for a person without a trade-mark to want to fix minimum prices
since his product cannot be identified by the consumer once it leaves his
hands, and the harmful effect of price wars cannot be traced to his goods.
It is the brand name owner, the presence of whose label in the homes of
the consumers is a constant reminder that his is a continuing relationship
with that large segment of the American population which "buys by brand,"
who needs resale price maintenance to protect his good will from the harmful
effect of price cutting and price wars. In the case of Old Dearborn Distribu-
ting Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 9 Justice Sutherland said,
As this court many times has said, the equal protection clause does
not preclude the state from resorting to classification for the purpose
of legislation. It only requires that the classification be reason-
37. From a statement by Robert L. Swain, Chairman, Fair Trade Committee,
National Association of Retail Druggists, before 75th Cong., House Judiciary Committee,
Hearing on H. R. 1611, Resale Price Maintenance (1937).
38. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 254, 251 (1877).
39. Supra note 36, at 197.
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able .... "' Enough appears already in this opinion to show the dif-
ference between trade-marked goods and others....
The court's other approach, however, is more tenable. Not all resale
price maintenance is superimposed by the manufacturer to protect the good
will of his trade-marked goods. Some retailers, in order to avoid the harmful
results of price wars, have favored resale price maintenance despite the fact
that the trade-mark owner-producers were indifferent to it, and the con-
sumers, missing their "bargains" which result from price wars, opposed it 1
Thus, it can be argued that the law benefits one group, the retailers, to the
definite detriment of another group, the consumers, and a possible detri-
ment to a third,42 the producer; and, therefore, denies equal protection of
law. Also, the law only protects some of these retailers, since there are many
enterprising price cutting stores, such as Webb's City, which oppose main-
tenance of resale prices. However, members of other special classes, minors
in their contractual relations, the insane in their criminal relations, young
girls in their sexual relations, are specially protected by law because we con-
sider it to be for the general good of society to do so. I do not mean to
class grown grocers with girls or lunatics, but there may be reasons to pro-
tect retailers as a class just as there is a reason to protect those less capable
of handling their own affairs. Therefore, if we also feel that our economic
well-being requires small retailers, as a class, to be protected so that they can
survive against the unequal competition of price cutting giants, it would not
seem that this type of legislation, in protecting them, would be any more
a denial of equal protection of law than would be any law protecting a
specially favored class. Of course, it nay be overstating the case to speak
of price cutting "giants," when people like Doc Webb are certainly not
giants and there are many producing giants who maintain prices.
C. Delegation of Legislative Authority.
The court assumed that the act was one of price fixing: a power which
even if exercised by the legislative branch or one of its administrative agen-
cies could have no constitutional basis without justification of public neces-
sity; and, therefore, the same result could not be reached by delegating the
power to private industries. Therefore, two questions arise: (I ) Is resale
price maintenance the same as price fixing? If it is not, then the statutes
are merely permissive and do not involve delegation of legislative powers.
40. Citing Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422-423 (1935).
41. Testifying in favor of resale price maintenance before a louse subcommittee
(see note 37 supra) were leaders representing such retail associations as retail druggists,
book sellers, retail grocers, chain drug stores, automobile dealers, toilet goods' dealers, tire
dealers, retail hardware, retail dry goods, etc. And, in 1937, the Druggists' Association
presented a draft of a uniform resale price maintenance act which was followed in many
states. Wolff, 4 TRADE REG. REv. 5 (1937).
42. The possible detriment to the producer exists in the cases where producers prefer
their products to be sold at the lowest possible price by retailers (and still give the retailers
some profit) to increase consumer demand; but, the producers are coerced into resale
price maintenance contracts by organized retailers who want a higher uniform resale price.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
However, if they are price fixing, (2) Are the statutes in such a form as to
violate the constitutional prohibition of delegation of legislative power?
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in the Old Dearborn case,43 stated that resale
price maintenance is not price fixing nor a delegation of power and contains
no element of compulsion, but is merely permissive of contracting. "It is
clear that this section does not attempt to fix prices, nor does it delegate
such power to private persons to contract with respect thereto. It contains
no element of compulsion but simply legalizes their acts, leaving them free
to enter into the authorized contract or not as they may see fit." This is not
completely accurate. The no-signor clause makes the resale price agreed
upon between a producer and distributor binding on those who deal in the
product, even though the latter have not entered into any contract relating
to the price that they will exact.
The argument has been made that this type of no-signor clause can
be upheld as an equitable servitude on chattels.44 However, the mere cate-
gorizing or analogizing an instrument which effectively sets prices with
equitable servitudes does not prevent the courts from looking at the effect
of the instrument and treat price setting by private parties with legislative
sanction the same as direct legislative price fixing. 45 This clause is justified
by the existence of the very complex merchandising systems in the United
States46 where the producer cannot possibly know all those who are distribu-
ting his product let alone get them to sign a resale price maintenance con-
tract. There are all sorts of ways that distributors can get the products
without signing the contract, and there are many difficulties in discovering
the leaks.47 Therefore, Justice Hobson's suggestion in the Liquor Stores
case48 that the producer can protect himself by a refusal to sell can be
answered by the fact that this is not always an effective or adequate means
of protection.
One might say that if a retailer refuses to deal with the producer's goods
on the producer's terms, he should refrain from dealing with them at all.
The restriction is known to the prospective purchaser, and he is under no
obligation to assume it; but, if with such presumptive knowledge he acquires
the property, morally and legally he is presumed to have accepted the con-
dition by his voluntary act of purchase.49  "Rather than interfering with
the liberty of contract, the legislature has only protected the bargaining
43. Supra note 36, at 192.
44. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 987-995
(1928); Note, 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 267, (1936); Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C.
163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939).
45. See Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); O'Gorman & Young,
Inc., v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931), where the statute was upheld only
because the insurance business was held to be "affected with a public interest."
46. 1 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF AMERICAN Bus-
INESS, RETAIL DISTRIBUTIoN 20.
47. See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 264 Fed. 885 (2d Cir.
1920); Singer Sewing Machine v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 339 (1925).
48. SuPra note 2, at 387.
49. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, supra note 44.
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power which the producer himself has attained. Hence, the statutes are not
necessarily analogous to price fixing statutes."'
This reasoning, of course, can be answered by the argument that one
cannot long run a business preserving the liberty of refusing to buy products
hamstrung by resale price maintenance contracts. He would soon find all
his sources of supply gone and himself out of business.
Despite the rather convincing argument that the no-signor clause indi-
cates some measure of compulsion, some absence of free will, and therefore
a degree of delegation of legislative power to fix prices, the state courts have
generally upheld fair trade laws which contained these clauses as not price
fixing statutes and therefore involving no unlawful delegation of legislative
power. In the case of Max Factor v, Kunsman, 2 the California court, in
holding that there was no price fixing involved, said, "The statute . . . does
not merely prohibit price cutting in order to regulate prices, but . . . to
protect the validly acquired rights of others." These rights, the court said,
were property rights in the good will of the product and "valuable . . . con-
tract rights." These courts seem to assume that the reason there is no un-
lawful delegation of legislative power is because there is no price fixing in-
volved. Whether a court would concede the presence of price fixing, but
would deny that this constituted unlawful delegation of power does not ap-
pear to have been considered.
Despite what the courts say about these actions not being price fixing,
one has trouble being convinced. The state is not necessarily the only instru-
ment of law making as the Austinian school would have us believe. There
are many schools of political thought that view this otherwise. Anarchism
denies completely the value of the state. Under the theories of Duguit and
Laski, with the latter's Political Pluralism, and under the laissez-faire doc-
trines, the state had relinquished to the individual certain "sovereign" func-
tions of laying down the rules which govern society. So, too, can we say
with fair trade law, that we have private law making which fixes prices 83
D. Differentiation Between Vertical and Horizontal Agreements.
Justice Barns said 4 that the public policy in Florida had always been
against contracts fixing prices and restricting trade. Therefore, to hold this
statute valid would be tantamount to saying that horizontal agreements and
contracts fixing prices or tending to stifle competition are void under the
anti-trust acts;5 5 but, vertical contracts doing the same thing are not only
valid but courts will aid and enforce such contracts. He continued that
50. Comment, 45 YALE L.I. 672, 678 (1936).
51. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, supra note 44; Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson, 176
Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939); Weco Products v. Reed Drug, 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W.
426 (1937).
52. 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936).
53. See generally, Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Har. L. Rav. 201
(1937).
54. Supra note 2, at 380.
55. FLA. STAT. c. 542 (1941).
56. Supra note 2, at 380.
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this is an arbitrary classification and it is unreasonable to punish those who
make horizontal agreements in restraint of trade and not those who make
vertical ones. Justice Hobson, in his special concurring opinion, called the
differentiation between horizontal and vertical contracts a "very technical
and finespun theory."5' 7
Apparently, there is a difference between the horizontal agreement,
the fixing of prices by so-called competitors along the same level so as to
force the consumer to buy at a dictated price as high as the traffic can bear;
and, the vertical agreement, where the price is fixed only down one partic-
ular chain from producer to wholesaler to retailer without any reference to
competing chains. The vertical agreement affects only one particular marked
product and does not fix the prices of competing products with different
brands, although it does fix the price of the same brand in competing
retail stores. When we realize that many of these agreements are imposed,
not by the producer, but by association of retailers, all of whom are supposed
to be in competition with each other, 8 we realize that there is a very close
relationship between horizontal price fixing, illegal under the Sherman Act
and Florida Law,59 and vertical price fixing of the resale price maintenance
type. Although most other courts have held otherwise, perhaps fair trade
laws are not wholly consistent with the theory and spirit of the anti-trust
laws, insofar as those laws condemn horizontal price fixing agreements.
However, it seems quite proper for the legislature to differentiate. It is up
to it if it wishes only to stop horizontal and to permit vertical price fixing.
If the legislature wishes to make some restraints of trade lawful, the Consti-
tution does not forbid this. The only objection that might be raised is that
legislatures are influenced by the arguments of a highly organized lobby of
retailers, while the unorganized consumers who elect these legislators seem
to be left unheard.
E. Fair Trade Laws Acceptable Only During Depression.
Chief Justice Adams admitted " ' that precedents from other jurisdictions
would lead to an approval of the act. However, these states enacted or ap-
proved this type of legislation before they had opportunity to observe the
effects of such legislation, which was conceived when there were surpluses of
commodities, and a need for such a law upon the economy, when the scale
of supply and demand had shifted the other way. In other words, when
during depression, there is a surplus of goods over demand and price cutting
would be more prevalent, a price floor is necessary; however, when demand
exceeds supply, the court saw justification for price ceilings, such as those
set by the 0. P. A., but not for minimum price maintenance. Justice Barns
also felt that fair trade laws were permissible during times of depression;
57. S pra note 2, at 387. Previous to this, on page 386, Hobson, J., makes astound-
ing bedfellows when he says that the legislature "'portrays monopolistic, if indeed they are
not communistic, tendencies.
58. See note 41 supra.
59. FLA. STAT. c. 542 (1941).
60. Supra note 2, at 374.
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but, he said that when there are shortages of goods there is no "free and
open competition,""' and it is not in the public interest to enforce the Flor-
ida fair trade law on behalf of a product in which there is no competition.
It is probably true that fair trade laws are more desirable at certain per-
iods in the economic cycle than in others. However, there is a belief that,
even during inflationary periods, this type of legislation is not undesirable.
The new Florida fair trade law states:
The public interest and general welfare of the State require the ...
maintenance of minimum resale prices ...as a permanent public
policy of the state, at all times, including periods of deflation or in-
flation .... 62
Also it seems rather unfortunate for concepts as supposedly basic as con-
stitutional ones to shift back and forth with the vagaries of our more fickle
laws of supply and demand. To declare a fair trade law constitutional in
1933, unconstitutional in 1949, and, then, perhaps, constitutional again in
1975, would seem to be giving scant respect to the Constitution which Glad-
stone described as ". . . the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given
time by the brain and purpose of man.' ' 63
As for Justice Barns' contention that during times of shortages, there
is no free and open competition and therefore the act should not be en-
forced: this seems to be small reason for declaring the act unconstitutional.
Assuming this to be the case, it would seem to be a much less drastic, and
certainly equally effective, means, merely to have the courts only enforce
the act where it finds the prerequisite of free and open competition existing,
and to refuse to enforce resale price maintenance contracts and to refuse to
penalize their violation in the absence of free and open competition.
F. Good and Bad Price Cutting
We come now to the possibility that there might be good and bad price
cutting, and that only the latter should be prohibited by fair trade laws.
Justice Hobson indicated that a law prohibiting only "loss leader" price
cutting might be less offensive."' Under the National Industrial Recovery
Act, price cutting "below cost" and the use of "loss leaders" were regulated.,"
"Loss leader" price cutting is of the type where the retailer cuts the price
of an article in demand and is willing to take a loss on it so as to attract
61. Supra note 24, § 3.
62. Id. § 1 (9).
63. FIsHER, VOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 11.
64. Supra note 2, at 387.
65. Although some feel that fair trade laws are an attack on loss leader merchandis-
ing (SELICMAN & LOVE, PRICE MAINTENANCE AND PRICE CUTTING. C. VII E 1932)), others
voice the view that the laws favor the small dealer at the expense of the big efficient out-
fit. (It's the old case of the little fellow against the big fellow." Assemblyman Crawford,
co-sponsor of the N. Y. Law, New York Times, April 11, 1935. "The essence of resale
price maintenance is control of price competition. Lack of adequate enforcement of the
anti-trust laws leaves a broad field for the activities of organized trade groups to utilize
it for their own advantage and to the detriment of the consumrs." SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMission, Dec. 13, 1946, LXI).
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purchasers into his store in hopes that they will buy other articles which he
sells at a profit. Price cutting below cost is similar but may be undertaken
for many devious reasons, among which are the attempt to crush local com-
petition, to control markets and distribution, etc. These types of price
cutting definitely hurt the producer's established good will and undermine
the public's confidence in the quality of his identified trade-marked product.
The opposing view on this question is that price cutting of popular brands
does not discredit the product in the eyes of the consumer, that the effect
of price cutting does not hurt any real value, but just deflates the bubble of
a fictitious advertised value. 6 1-lowever, there seems to be little argument
against the contention that the prohibition of "good" price cutting, that
based upon superior business effi&iency and the elimination of luxury serv-
ices, would act only to penalize the "cash and carry" consumer; higher
prices than otherwise would prevail; 7 and, it would mean a subsidy of in-
efficient, high cost distribution units otherwise eliminated by competition,
and the stultification of lower cost distribution systems eliminating the in-
centive to attempt to improve their methods and pass the savings oil to the
consumer. The great question is whether these consequences outweight those
injuries caused by "loss leaders" and price wars; and, whether legislation can
effectively differentiate between "good" and "bad" price cutting.
G. Ownership of the Trade-Mark.
In the discussion of the injury done to the producer by price cutting,
he has been referred to as the "owner" of the trade-mark. However, Justice
Barns, in his concurring opinion in the Liquor Stores case, 8 indicated that
once the product is sold with its trade-mark, trade-name, brand, etc., at-
tached and part of it, the producer no longer retains what he has sold and
the purchaser becomes owner of the commodity with the trade-mark: and,
the purchaser is entitled to what he has bought. The question whether or
not a trade-mark is property is not too important. It is an interest in sub-
stance, and the real question is how far this interest should allow the owner
of the mark to control what happens to his product after it leaves his hands.
H. The Existence .of an Oligopoly.
The court found that the plaintiff corporation was one of about forty
subsidiary companies whose parent corporation controlled from eighty to
ninety per cent of the liquor trade in the United States. Therefore, as a
second ground for the decision, Chief Justice Adams said that the whiskies
were not in free and open competition and therefore do not come within
the terms of the statute; ". . . relief should be denied even though the act
is not unconstitutional." 9
If plaintiff, as the court says,70 fails to make a case under the act, it
66. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 9,
162 (1931).
67. HARINc, RETAIL PRICE CUTTING 195 (1935).
68. Supra note 2, at 387.
69. Supra note 2, at 376.
70. Ibid.
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seems unnecessary for the court to use this case to declare the act uncon-
stitutional when it can dispose of the case on other grounds.7'
I. Conclusions.
In discussing the treatment of this law by the Florida Supreme Court,
two questions have been paramount. First, was the 1939 law a desirable
law, which ought to have been passed by the legislature? Second, was it a
constitutional law, which ought to have been upheld by the court? Of
course, an answer of "no" for the second question would seem to mean
"no" for the first, but the reverse is not necessarily so. It would seem, from
the above discussed criticism of the court's opinion, that the second question
could be answered "yes," that perhaps the court was not warranted in over-
turning this law on constitutional grounds. However, the first question, the
desirability of this law, is more difficult to answer, and, perhaps, can better
be dealt with in discussing Florida's new fair trade law.
1II. THE NEw LAW
Florida's new fair trade act, 2 which became law without the Governor's
signature on June 1st, 1949, is very similar to the old one7" declared uncon-
stitutional in the Liquor Stores case 4 with but three significant changes.
These additions are: (1) a legislative "findings of fact" which was a policy
declaration expressing the legislature's disfavor with the economic grounds
for the Supreme Court's invalidation of the act; (2) a substantive change
to lessen the possibility of monopolistic oligopolies and their satellites from
qualifying as fair traders tinder the act; and, (3) a procedural change to
assure that the new law will not encourage a suppression of competition.
A. The Policy Declaration.
In Section One of the new act, the legislature in seven paragraphs,7 5
stated, in essence, that small retailers cannot survive the price cutting of the
larger stores; and, without resale price maintenance, the good will of the
trade-mark owner would be hurt and retail commerce would be monopolized
by a small group. The legislature found that "public interest and general
welfare" would be best served by resale price maintenance; that predatory
price cutting has been "the most potent weapon to which the great and
destructive trusts have resorted. . ." This, the legislature concluded, ad-
versely affects the general public whether the time be deflationary or in-
flationary. This legislative declaration is an attempt to answer the Supreme
Court's economic policy reasons for invalidating the act; to show that the
legislative intention was that such an act be effective during an upward as
71. Economy Cleaners v. Cleaning, Dyeing & Pressing Boards, 128 Fla. 408, 174
So. 829 (1937). This type of oligopoly has been held to be a violation of the Sherman
Act, United States v. Frankfort Distillers, 324 U.S. 293 (1945), and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 168 F.2d
175 (7th Cir. 1948).
72. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25204.
73. Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19201.
74. Supra note 2.
75. Supra note 24, § 1.
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well as a downward spiral in the price structure; and, a declaration that the
legislature was acting within its police power. To declare its intention and
economic policy seems to be quite a proper function of the legislature.
However, for the legislature to declare that the new fair trade law shall
not be held unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature has exceeded
its own powers would seem plainly ineffectual. Although declarations of
policy can be made by both, it would seem to be the province of the judicial,
and not the legislative, branch to determine whether the statutes passed by
the legislature exceed the legislative powers. The original conception of
judicial review was that the courts should compare the applicable clause of
the constitution with, a challenged statute and from a consideration of the
words alone, decide whether the two were in conflict.7 6
There has been a gradual movement away from this view. Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland"" made clear that the court should also
consider the condition of the nation and its needs. There developed the
doctrine that "the ultimate question is not what is the meaning of the con-
stitution, but whether the legislation is sustainable or not;"78 and so, "an
act of the legislature is not ...declared void, unless the violation of the
constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."7
This theory of "judicial self-abnegation," that the court should not allow
its economic or other theories to intrude so long as the legislation is in some
way constitutionally sustainable, as expressed by Justice Chapman in his dis-
sent in the Liquor Stores case, 0 has been the basis for the courts' allowing the
legislature to change the doctrines of constitutional law in some fields,8 1
including economic regulation under the due process clause.
The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the National Labor
Relations Act 2 in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin,83  was very much influenced
by the legislative "findings and declaration of policy." The same court, in
Nebbia v. New York,"4 upheld a milk price fixing statute largely on the
basis of the "legislative finding; statement of policy,"' 5 overruling a case 6
litigated before the passage of the statute. In upholding a Washington
minimum wage law87 which contained a general statement that the welfare
of the state demanded this protection, the court in 'West Coast Hotel v.
76. THm FEOERALIST, No. 78 at 357 et sea (Hallowell's ed. 1857).
77. 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
78. THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE ANERICAN DOCTRINES OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1908), Legal Essays I.
79. Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binney 117, 123 (Pa. 1811).
80. Supra note 2.
81. Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 861 (1950).
82. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 151 (1940).
83. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
84. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
85. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 69, § 300.
86. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
87. Wash. Laws 1913, c. 174.
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Parrish,s8 overruled two previous cases." ' Therefore, it would not be wholly
inconsistent with the present trend in constitutional law for the court to
bow to the economic judgment of the legislature as expressed in its "findings
of fact." However, all these cases went on other grounds as well as follow-
ing the legislative findings, and it is doubtful that these alone would be
sufficient to work a change of heart upon the court.
In addition, we should view each finding of fact in the light of its own
merits and see whether it warrants a great deal of judicial attention. The
findings in the Florida fair trade law undoubtedly drafted with the aid of
the retailers' lobby, the findings in tie 'aft-Hartley Act compiled by the
N.A.M., the findings in the proposed Mundt-Nixon Bill, all do not neces-
sarily represent the true state of affairs, and, perhaps, not even the opinion
of the majority of the legislators, who probably did not read them, of the
true state of affairs.
Also, this economic judgment and intent of the Florida Legislature
seemed quite apparent before the adoption of the new act; the court ignored
it in the Liquor Stores case, 0 and there might be little reason for the court
to accede to such judgment simply because the legislature has spelled it out.
Furthermore, even the cases going the farthest with the liberal due process
theory in giving the legislatures free rein have limited themselves by saying
that ". . . [the] regulation, is unconconstitutional only if arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free
to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with in-
dividual liberty." 9' The Florida Supreme Court has said that the fair trade
law is all these things, and much more; and, therefore, it is questionable
whether these legislative "findings of fact" are sufficiently conclusive to
override the habitual hostility of the Florida Supreme Court to fair trade
laws and resale price maintenance.
B. The Substantive Change.
In Section 3(4), the new act adds the following:
Commodities which bear, or the labels or containers of which bear,
trade marks, brands, or names or producers or distributors who shall
be controlled (sic) by or through any common ownership, for the
purposes of this chapter, shall be treated as a single commodity hav-
ing a single producer or distributor2
This probably means that where a number of different brands are under
the control of common ownership they shall be treated as all produced by
88. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
89. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Morehead v. New York
ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). The court said that it only distinguished the latter
case, but its explanation "is a story that should bring blushes to'those who ioined in the
official narration," Powell, Some Aspects of American Constitutional Law, 53 H~av. L.
Rtv. 529, 549 (1940).
90. Supra note 2.
91. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
92. Supra note 24, § 3(4).
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a single producer. Thus, the various brands of goods controlled by an olig-
opoly would be treated as one brand and not in competition with each other.
Where the outside competition was very small, as in the Liquor Stores
case 3 where the plaintiff was a subsidiary of a family controlling at least
80% of the liquor trade, or non-existent, there would be deemed to be an
absence of free and open competition, and the producers of these products
born of common ownership could not qualify as fair traders under the fair
trade law.
This does not seem to add too much to the old act. It had already been
declared that free and open competition was a prerequisite under the act;'
aid, without the aid of Section 3(4), the Supreme Court had already deter-
mined that the plaintiff in the Liquor Stores case 5 could not qualify under
this prerequisite. However, this standard of free and open competition, a]-
though probably constitutionally acceptable, is really much too vague to be
of much use. Without a definite standard to govern him, the producer
runs the risk of prosecution under the state anti-trust laws; and, the standard
serves really no good purpose since a producer with a monopoly can set his
own price anyway without needing the aid of a fair trade law or a resale price
maintenance contract. It is true that Section 3(4) can be used as a basis
for the contention that the law is not as arbitrary as the court found it to be;
and, with its stated objective of measuring and retarding the growth of
monopolistic and oligopolistic evils, the provision is commendable.
C. The Procedural Change.
Section 10 of the new act provides for actions by the Attorney General
to restrain the enforcement of contracts in which the commodities to which
said contracts pertain are not in free and open competition with commod-
ities of the same general class, or if the contracts prevent competition.9
The provision is undoubtedly aimed at the contention of the court that con-
tracts obstructing competition would be protected by the fair trade law.
Undoubtedly, the legislature should have added "contracts in restraint of
trade;" and, rather than making the action of the Attorney General per-
missive, it should have been couched in more mandatory language. This
provision is probably not an unlawful delegation of legislative powers since
executive or administrative officers may exercise quasi legislative functions
not assigned by the constitution exclusively to a branch of the government.T
However, there is some strong precedent which may be construed to hold
to the contrary.98
93. Supra note 2.
94. Supra note 24, § 3.
95. Supra note 2, at 376.
96, Supra note 24, § 1.
97. McMullen v. Newman Corp., 100 Fla. 733, 129 So. 870 (1930).
98. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In Fulton v.
Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936), it was held that a Barber Board was given ex-
cessive authority for price fixing when authorized by statute to change prices throughout
the state, at it own discretion. It should be remembered, however, that the Attorney
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This provision seems to have gone beyond most other states' statutes.
Wisconsin is a notable exception where complaints can be made to the Wis-
consin Department of Agriculture and Markets if established prices are
claimed to be unfair.,9
This was the only procedural change in the new law. Whether this
will be sufficient to satisfy the court is doubtful, particularly since there is no
guaranty that the vague standards of "free and open competition"'0 0° will
assure that the public interests will always be protected. Chief Justice
Adams' prerequisites for a constitutional "price fixing" fair trade law, the
assurances of "reasonableness," "due notice," or "review" of a fair trader's
price fixing practices,' 0' are not covered. However, these prerequisites were
formulated by Chief Justice Adams without any argument to support the
conclusion that fair trade acts must contain these as necessary elements; al-
though, it is true that the Florida Supreme Court has said that,10 2 "The law
must require notice and give opportunity to be heard; it is not enough that
the public get it by chance. Otherwise the requirements of due process
fail. . . " Still, if the required element of "free and open competition" is
present, it can be argued that there is no need for abstract standards of
reasonableness and administrative or court review. Justice Hobson's ob-
jection that we should have a definite measuring stick and not leave the
power to determine the prices "to the unleashed discretion of the trade-
name owner"103 has not been satisfied since the Attorney General only
prosecutes those obstructing competition and has no power over the actual
price fixing itself.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the new Florida fair
trade laws is essentially like the old statute which was declared unconstitu-
tional. However, since the grounds for the invalidation of the earlier act
were, as outlined above, subject to criticism, there is a possibility, although
perhaps not probability, of the court's reversing itself. With the possibilities
of the court's (a) declaring the new law unconstitutional on the same basis
as the invalidation of the old statute, (b) declaring the new law constitution-
al on the basis that it has cured the alleged evils of the old statute, or (c) de-
claring the new law constitutional by reversing its decision on the old statute,
it seems idle practice to attempt to predict the life expectancy of the new
law.
Perhaps, it is more useful to discuss what the court and legislature
General does not fix or change prices; he merely prosecutes those he deems to be obstruct-
ing competition.
99. IVs. STAT. 1947, c. 133, § 25(7).100. Because Eastman Kodachrome filn was held not to be in free and open compe-
tition, a cease and desist order against its price fixing was upheld, Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946).
101. Supra note 2, at 375.
102. Robbins v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 153 Fla. 822, 16 So.2d 121 (1943).
103. Supra note 2, at 387.
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should do: whether resale price maintenance is or is not desirable. The
previous discussion of "good" and "bad" price fixing is relevant here. Un-
derlying this discussion, there should be a realization that a large portion
of our retail trade is not affected by these laws. As Justice Chapman said in
his dissent, the law does not give arbitrary power to fix minimum resale
prices "on all the necessities of life,"'10 4 but is restricted to branded and
trade-marked products in free and open competition with similar products.
This would mean the exclusion of products controlled by monopolies or
oligopolies, as was the case with those goods sold by the Continental Dis-
tilling Corporation. It would also probably mean the exclusion of liquidated
sales, sales of damaged goods or "seconds" (trade-mark owners usually re-
quire that their marks be removed from "seconds"), forced sales by courts,
mail orders or any other type of direct distribution from the producer to
the consumer, private brands which are used by large distributing chains,
cases where the manufacturer keeps the title and the goods are distributed
by agents, 05 and, of course, any other case of unbranded or unmarked goods.
It has been estimated that fair trade acts affect not more than ten per cent
of the entire retail trade in the United States.10 6 And yet, it has also been
estimated that fair trading practice costs the consuming public at least five
hundred million dollars annually.10t
Additional provisions to the Florida fair trade law seem necessary really
to make it a "fair" fair trade law. One could be the establishment of an
appropriate administrative agency which would administer, and, in proper
cases, enforce the new law. All proposed fair trade contracts could be first
submitted to this body, and it would determine whether they comply with
the statute. Additional powers of this agency could include: (I ) publishing
periodically notice of submitted fair trade prices and contracts; (2) holding
hearings in regard to the contracts, prices, and other matters under the act;
(3) allowing and disallowing each prospective fair trader's submitted prices.
It might be provided that from the agency's decision on the prices and con-
tracts, appeal could be taken to the courts under the usual procedures of
administrative law.
There are certainly other substantive provisions which probably should
be added to any "fair" fair trade law. The producer should be required to
set his prices equally and without any favor among his retailers; and, uni-
form enforcement of the contracts should be guaranteed.",' To assure the
latter, it would seem necessary to give the courts power to add as party de-
104. Supra note 2, at 387.
105. Even here there are attempts by the agent-distributor to circumvent the price
fixing of the principal manufacturer which are quite prevalent in the auto industry where
large "trade-in" allowances can be made.
106. 7 TRADE, REc. REv. 6.
107. The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, Fortune, )an. 1949, p. 70.
108. See Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 186 Md. 210, 46 A.2d
101 (1946).
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fendant any favored retailer who was breaching the resale price maintenance
contract and whom the producer neglected to sue; although the producer
was suing another retailer for a similar breach of the same contract. Other
necessary substantive changes might include a full definition of "free and
open competition" and "fair price." In addition, the treatment prescribed
in Section 3(4) of the new actO" should be avoided in the cases where
adequate proof is given that the prices on the articles produced under com-
mon ownership were independently arrived at.
As indicated before, the conclusion as to the fate of resale price main-
tenance must ultimately rest on an attempt to weigh the conflicting interests
of the consumer who wants low prices as a result of open competition, the
retailer who does not want to risk the dangers of price wars, and the manu-
facturer who wants to preserve the good will of his product.
As indicated above, the arguments, pro and con, both legal and econ-
omic are rather complex and should not be oversimplified. The ideal result
would seem to be a compromise, an attempt to prohibit, by a fair trade
law, the type of below cost and loss leader price cutting which tends to dis-
credit trade-marks and stifle competition; but, not that which is a natural
result of efficiency, the savings as a result of which should be passed on to
the consumers. This type of statute may be impossible to draft, and without
effective differentiation, the cure may be worse than the disease; but, it is
a norm toward which any fair trade policy should attempt to approach.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The above article is particularly pertinent in view of the recent
decision of the United States Suprenme Court, on May 21, 1951, which invalidated the
"no-signors" provisions in state fair trade laws. Mr. Fink's article, which was written
previous to the handing down of this decision, contains in it similar views to those
expressed by the Supreme Court, and interesting and valuable background material for
anyone desiring to analyze this recent decision,
109. Supra note 72.
